A new systematic authentication scheme based on the Gray map over Galois rings is introduced. The Gray map determines an isometry between the Galois ring and a vector space over a Galois field. The introduced code attains optimal impersonation and substitution probabilities.
Introduction
Resilient maps were introduced in 1985 by Chor et al. [4] and independently by Bennettet al. [1] , in the context of key distribution and quantum cryptography protocols. Resilient maps have been used also in the generation of random sequences aimed to stream ciphering [10] .
We introduce a new authentication systematic code with the purpose to optimally reduce the success probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks.
In a former construction [7] , two codes on Galois rings were introduced based on resilient maps, in a similar manner as in [3] .
The current code construction is based mainly on the Gray map and it is in line with previously constructed codes using rational, non-degenerated and bent functions on Galois rings and also with other codes that use compositions of maps and the generalized Gray map on Galois rings [6, 8, 9] .
Here, through the generalized Gray map and resilient maps on Galois rings we obtain minimal upper bounds for the attack probabilities, improving in this way former codes. Indeed, the obtained impersonation and substitution are optimal. However, the introduced code diminishes the source sate space with respect to the tag and key spaces. We introduce precise characteristics on Galois rings of the notions of resilient maps and generalized Gray function. The introduced construction over Galois rings is translated into finite fields via the Gray map, providing thus similar codes on Galois fields as those in [7] .
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall the basic construction of the Gray map. Then in Section 3 we introduce a new systematic authentication code based on the Gray map. At Subsection 3.1 we recall the general construction of a systematic authentication code, at Subsection 3.2 we give a precise definition of the new code and at Subsection 3.3 we show its main properties, in a rather long but exhaustive way we prove that the key space is in a bijective correspondence with the set of encoding maps.
The Gray map
Let p be a prime number and r, , m ∈ Z + . Let us write q = p . Let A = GR (p r , ) and B = GR (p r , m) be the corresponding Galois rings, A is an extension of Z p r and B is an extension of A. Let T B/A : B → A, T B/Z p r : B → Z p r and T A/Z p r : A → Z p r be the corresponding trace maps, and let pA and pB denote the sets of zero divisors of A and B respectively.
Firstly, let us recall well known facts [9] :
Then the following assertions hold:
Let us assume, from now on, that r ≥ 2. The homogeneous weight on the ring A is the map [6] 
and according to Lemma 1,
The ring A can be considered as well as the metric space (A, d h ).
Let us define the Gray map which relates Galois rings and Galois fields. Let Fbe the q-dimensional vector space over the Galois field F q . Let ⊗ denote the Kroenecker product
and let us iterate this product "by the right":
i=0 be the j-th vector in the canonical basis of F, where δ ij is the Kroenecker delta, 1 (q) = (1, . . . , 1) = q−1 j=0 e j ∈ F, the vector with constant entries equal to 1, and ρ : A → F p the reduction modulus p map. Let
be a set of Teichmüller representatives at A and let
For each index i = 0, . . . , r − 2 let
From relation (3) we see that the vector φ i is the concatenation of q i blocks, each one consisting of the concatenation of blocks of the form [ρ j ] q r−2−i , where ρ j is the j-th coordinate of Ξ, for j = 0, . . . , q − 1.
Then, the vector φ i can be efficiently constructed: given an index k, with
In summary, for each i = 0, . . . , r − 2, φ i defined by (3) can be expressed as:
where we are using the notation introduced immediately after the relation (3). As a last vector, let us define
The Gray map is defined as follows
where the elements of A are represented in their p-adic form.
In particular, for the special case of r = 2, we have
Then the Gray map, as defined by (5), equals, for any r 0 + r 1 p ∈ GR p 2 , :
which coincides with the definition given at [9] . The vector space F q r−1 q can be endowed of a structure of metric space with the Hamming distance d H : the distance between two vectors is the number of entries at which they differ.
Two important properties of the Gray map are stated by the following two propositions:
The following assertions hold: 1. Isometry [6] . The Gray map is an isometry between the Galois ring A and the vector space
2. The Gray map preserves addition [8] :
A systematic authentication code based on the Gray map

General systematic authentication codes
We recall that a systematic authentication code without secrecy [5] is a structure (S, T, K, E) where S is the source state space, T is the tag space, K is the key space and E = (e k ) k∈K is a sequence of encoding rules S → T . A transmitter and a receiver agree a secret key k ∈ K. Whenever a source s ∈ S should be sent, the participants proceed according to the following protocol: The communicating channel is public, thus it can be eavesdropped by an intruder that is able to perform either impersonation or substitution attacks through the public channel. The intruder's success probabilities for impersonation and substitution are, respectively
A new systematic authentication code
In the context of finite fields of characteristic 2, for n ∈ Z + and t ≤ n, let J = {j 0 , . . . , j t−1 } ⊂ {0, . . . , n − 1} be an index t-subset. The affine J-variety determined by a = (a 0 , . . . , a t−1 )
The notion of t-resilient maps has been studied by several authors in the context of Galois rings, assumed as the last property of the above paragraph, and well known wider classes of t-resilient maps have been provided. For instance, from Theorem 1 in [2] , we have that for any n ∈ Z + , if B is a Galois ring and f 0 : B n → B n is a map such that any element at its image f 0 (B n ) has more than t entries which are units in B and f 1 :
Let us build in this section a systematic authentication code using Gray maps.
Let p > 2 be a prime number, r, , m ∈ Z + , and q = p . Let us assume the same setting as in the first paragraph of Section 2.
Let us denote by U (B) = (B − pB) ∪ {0} the set of elements at the Galois ring B that are either units or zero.
Let n ∈ Z + be another positive integer, and let f : B n → B be a t-resilient map. The following assertions hold:
, is balanced (as composition of balanced maps). -As a more general result than Corollary 2 of [11] , we have that the map
As shown in [2] , ζ af (b) = 0 under the same conditions as the above assertion, just because the map
Let T (A) and T (B) be sets of the Teichmüller representatives of A and B respectively. Let us remark that the principal ideal generated by p r−1 within A can be expressed as
Let n ∈ Z + and t ≤ n. For any i < n, let e i = (δ ij ) n−1 j=0 be the i-th vector in the canonical basis of B n . For any b ∈ T (B) n , let
be an (r − 1)n-subset of T (A) − {0, 1}, and let
Then D η ⊂ A × B n , and |D η | = (r − 1)n.
Let us assume that
Then
Then T ηθζ ⊂ B × B n , and
Certainly, at this point the definition of the source set S is quite unnatural. However, defined in this way, it guarantees a distance between elements of special form (see Proposition 2 below) leading to optimality results (see Proposition 4 below), while preserving the balancedness of the maps x → T B/Z p r (af (x) + b · x), for a t-resilient map f . The special form of S also allows to prove that the correspondence between keys and encoding maps is one-to-one (see Proposition 3 below).
From relations (13) we have S ⊂ B × B n × A, and
The introduced construction imposes the supplementary condition (r − 1)(n + 1) < p m − 1.
Main characteristics of the new code
Let Φ : A → F q r−1 q be the Gray map on A as defined by (5) . We observe that for any y = r−2 i=0 a i p i ∈ L, with (a 0 , . . . , a r−2 ) ∈ T (A) r−1 (see (10)), the evaluation of Φ at y, according with (5) , is
We remark also that, since q − 1 is even, for any ξ generating T A , either −ξ ∈ T A or −1 ∈ T A , thus the following implication holds:
Hence, if the p-adic form of an element in
(see relation (8) above). Let us define the following arrays:
Since p r−1 A = q, we have F q 
Proof Let s 2 = s 0 − s 1 and w 2 = w 0 − w 1 . Then:
(equality (i) holds because Φ is an isometry, equality (ii) follows from the defining relation (1), and equality (iii) is due to relation (15)). If (s 02 , s 12 ) = (0, 0), since f is t-resilient and x → T B/Z p r (r s 12 · x)) is a balanced map, from (17) the claim follows: d H (u s0,w0 , u s1,w1 ) = q rmn (q r−1 − q r−2 ).
If (s 02 , s 12 ) = (0, 0), also from (17) we obtain
For each k ∈ K = Z q r(mn+1) , let e k : S → T be the map s → e k (s) = π k (u s ) : the k-th entry of the array u s .
The set of encoding rules in the proposed systematic authentication code is thus E = (e k ) k∈K .
Proposition 3
The map K → E, k → e k , is one-to-one.
Proof The proposition is clearly equivalent to the following statement:
where u s is given by the relation (16). According to (16), each array u s , s ∈ S, is the concatenation of q arrays u s,w , each of length q rmn . The index range {0, . . . , q r(mn+1) − 1} of the array u s can be split as the concatenation of q rmn+1 integer intervals K x,w = {indexes of entries with the value Φ (v s,w (x))} with (x, w) ∈ B n × p r−1 A, and each integer interval K x,w has length q r−1 .
We recall at this point that
. . , q −1} be corresponding natural bijections. Then, up to these enumerations and the representation sketched at relation (4), we may identify
Let k 0 , k 1 ∈ K ≈ {0, . . . , q r(mn+1) − 1} be two keys such that k 0 = k 1 . Depending on the intervals K x,w in which these keys fall, we may consider four cases.
The analysis of these cases, providing a full proof of the proposition, is rather extensive, thus we postpone it to the appendix.
Proposition 4
For the authentication scheme defined by the relations (13) and (18) the following equations hold:
Proof Let s = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S and x ∈ B n be fixed, then the map
is one-to-one. Then, for any t ∈ T = F q , we have
where u s is defined by relation (16). Since |K| = q r(mn+1) , we have, from (6), p I = 1 q . Now, we consider s 0 = (s 00 , s 10 , s 20 ), s 1 = (s 01 , s 11 , s 21 ) ∈ S such that s 0 = s 1 . For each t 0 , t 1 ∈ T , and each k ∈ K, let w ∈ p r−1 A and x ∈ B n be such that k ∈ K x,w . Then,
From here, it can be seen that
Now, from (7), (22), we have:
Observe at this point that it is possible to take, instead of N at (13), the set N = {b ∈ B n | w h (b) ≤ t 2 } in order to produce a new systematic authenticatication code with the same impersonation and substitution probabilities as in (21).
Conclusions
We have constructed an authentication code using the trace and the Gray maps. In this regard, the current construction is similar to former constructions [8, 9] . In order to diminish the substitution and impersonation probabilities, we used here resilient maps on Galois rings of general characteristic p r , with p a prime number and r an integer greater or equal than 2, in contrast with the former approach based either on non-degenerate and rational maps on Galois rings of general characteristic [9] , or on bent maps at Galois rings of characteristic p 2 [8] . The current construction provides optimal substitution and impersonation probabilities, at the cost of cardinalities growth and an elaborated space structure. Proof Let (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ {0} × (N − {0}) (see relation (13)). Let us write in p-adic form
For each k ∈ {0, . . . , r − 2}, there exists y (k) = r−2 i=0 y ik p i ∈ L such that
Thus,
choose j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} such that the j-th entry of x − y is not zero, namely
T θζ k k as defined at (12) ; we have Last expressions can be evaluated by relation (5) . We have that (s 0 , s 1 , y (k) ) ∈ S and w ∈ p r−1 A. Now, let k 00 = k 0 − kx,w and k 10 = k 1 − kx,w. Let us consider several possibilities:
q |(k 10 − k 00 ): By taking a r−2 = 0, all other coefficients zero, and s = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ), we have that the k 00 -projection of us,w (see (16)) differs to its k 10 -projection, thus π k 0 (us) = π k 1 (us).
let j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} be such that and all other coefficients zero, and s = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ), we have that the k 00 -projection of us,w differs to its k 10 -projection, thus π k 0 (us) = π k 1 (us).
Lemma 3 Under the condition arriving at statement II.0.0 in Plan 2, the implication 19 holds.
We express in their p-adic forms T B/A (θx j ) and T B/A (θy j ), namely
Thus
and consequently a 0 − b 0 = 0. Also
and consequently a 1 −b 1 = 0. Successively, we get ∀k ≤ r −2, a k = b k , and (a r−1 −b r−1 )p ∈ pA − {0}. Hence a r−1 = b r−1 . And consequently:
Let s 0 = 0, s 1 = θe j , s 2 = 0 and s = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S. Then, according to (15),
And, in particular, π k 00 • Φ (vs,w(x)) = π k 10 • Φ (vs,w(x)) .
Thus, implication (19) holds on these conditions.
Lemma 4 Under the condition arriving at statement II.0.1.0.0 in Plan 2, the implication 19 holds.
Proof Choose
Then,
Mutatis mutandis we get
hence Φ (vs,w(x)) = Φ (vs,w(y)). And, in particular, π k 00 • Φ (vs,w(x)) = π k 10 • Φ (vs,w(x)) .
Thus, implication (19) holds on these conditions. Proof Let s 0 = 0, s 1 = e j , s 2 = 0 and s = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S. Then as in Lemma 3 we conclude that π k 00 • Φ (vs,w(x)) = π k 10 • Φ (vs,w(y)).
Lemma 7 Under the condition arriving at statement II.0.1.1.0.1 in Plan 2, the implication 19 holds.
Proof There is a pair (s 0 , s 1 ) = (θ, p t e j ) in the set Dη, as defined at (11) , such that
We write in p-adic form Proof In this case, π k 00 • Φ T B/A (η (r−1)n f (x)) = π k 10 • Φ η (r−1)n T B/A (f (y)) and there exists a value η (r−1)n ∈ T (A) − {0} such that η (r−1)n does not appear at η, just because (r − 1)(n + 1) < p m − 1. Now, we choose s 1 = 0 ∈ B n , s 2 = 0 and s = (η (r−1)n , 0, 0). Then, π k 00 • Φ (vs,w(x)) = π k 00 • Φ T B/A (s 0 f (x) + s 1 · x) + s 2 + w = π k 00 • Φ T B/A (η (r−1)n f (x)) + w = π k 10 • Φ T B/A (η (r−1)n f (y)) + w = π k 10 • Φ (vs,w(y)) and, consequently, the implication (19) holds.
Lemma 9 Under the condition arriving at statement II.1.0 in Plan 3, the implication 19 holds.
Proof There is a θ ∈ T B such that T B/A (θ(x j − y j ))j ∈ p r−1 A − {0}. By writing T B/A (θx j ) and T B/A (θy j ) in p-adic form as in (23) hence Φ (vs,w(x)) = Φ (vs,w(y)). And, in particular, π k 00 • Φ (vs,w(x)) = π k 10 • Φ (vs,w(x)) .
